One of the meanings of "line" is "the trace of a moving point" (OED), and it is within the context of an idea of movement that I now turn to a consideration of justice and the art of reconciliation. Derrida"s reflections on the "force of law" are pertinent to my discussion. In its multivalency, "force" exposes Derrida"s conception of the aporetic relation between justice and the law, and between what he terms the founding and preserving violence of the law. The titular prominence given to "force" in both "Force and Signification" and "Force of Law" invites me to bring about a convergence of questions of law and of signification -which in this chapter I associate with literary signification and signification in the visual arts. The operative space of reconciliation, I argue, is at this point of convergence.
Firstly, it is necessary to consider the way in which "force" exposes an aporetic relation between justice and the law. On the one hand, for Derrida, "force" is not exterior to the law, and neither is justice: force is "essentially implied in the very concept of justice as law, of justice as it becomes law, of the law as law."
18 But this is not to say that justice is absolutely subsumed within the law: so that, on the other hand, Derrida is insistent that he "reserve the possibility of a justice, indeed of a law [loi] that not only exceeds or contradicts law but also, perhaps, has no relation to law." 19 Thus, "Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it demands that one calculate with the incalculable." 20 As I have already begun to suggest, justice and reconciliation require that the participants speak a mutually shared language, but this question of language in itself circles back on the aporia of justice and the law, on the force that justice-as-law demands:
To address oneself to the other in the language of the other is both the condition of all possible justice, it seems, but, in all rigor, it appears not only impossible (since I cannot speak the language of the other except to the extent that I appropriate it and assimilate it according to the law
[loi] of an implicit third) but even excluded by justice as law, inasmuch as justice as law seems to imply an element of universality, the appeal to a third party who suspends the unilaterality or singularity of the idioms.
someone who asks my forgiveness, but whom I understand and who understands me, then a process of reconciliation has begun; the third has intervened." 22 This "process of reconciliation" is not safely situated within the bounds of a received grammar; it requires a crossing of the line, a breach with the directive geometry of the law, which opens onto questions of justice, and an ethics of address and response: "And so we have already, in the fact that I speak the language of the other and break with mine, in the fact that I give myself up to the other, a singular mixture of force, justesse and justice." This "break" with one"s own idiom is something that the poet, Paul
Celan, understands as being integral to the creation of and response to a work of art; art"s encounters thus have an ethical resonance. The one "whose eyes and mind are occupied with art … forgets about himself. Art makes for distance from the I. Art requires that we travel a certain space in a certain direction, on a certain road." 24 But this is not to say that art follows a clearly marked path to a predetermined destination: "perhaps poetry, like art, moves with the oblivious self into the uncanny and strange to free itself. Though where? in which place? how? as what? This would mean art is the distance poetry must cover … La poésie, elle aussi, brûle nos étapes," 25 which is to say that art breaks the path, it is "language actualized, set free under the sign of a radical individuation which, however, remains as aware of the limits drawn by language as of the possibilities it opens." 26 The "place" of art, and the "direction" in which it travels, cannot be mathematically determined by a set of a priori spatial and temporal co-ordinates:
The poem is lonely. It is lonely and en route. Its author stays with it.
Does this very fact not place the poem already here, at its inception, in the encounter, in the mystery of encounter?
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My discussion is gradually bringing about a convergence of two lines of force: the force of law, and the force of art. I do not wish to make a crude claim that law and art operate in exactly the same way, but the movement of convergence is towards this point: both the force of law and the force of art reach out for the creation of a new semantic articulation. In speaking about reconciliation I find myself at this chiasmatic intersection, which is neither exclusively in the realm of law, nor in that of the political. 28 Both law (especially constitutional law) and the politics of reconciliation raise the possibility of a reconstituted future community within the fields of affect that they instantiate. And this instantiation of new fields of affect is surely one source of motivation for art.
What is at stake in the act of creating meaning in the arts? For Celan (as we have seen), the place of art is in the mystery of an encounter that breaks, rather than follows new paths of meaning. In other words, art is a risk, the meaning of which is not guaranteed in advance. In ways that are strikingly reminiscent of the passages I have cited from Celan above, Derrida, in his 27 Ibid., emphasis in the original. 28 The place of reconciliation in relation to that of law and politics is cause for debate in contemporary legal theory. See, for instance, the collection of essays in Scott Veitch (ed Arendt, speaks of political reconciliation. The "act of constitution" Schaap sees as the first step in a sequence of reconciliation, an act which entails both beginning and promising. On the one hand, it requires that we conceive the present as a point of origin, which might appear in retrospect as the moment in which a "people" first appeared on the political scene. On the other hand, it requires that former enemies promise "never again" in order to condition the possibility of community in the future.
Schaap thus uses the word "constitution" not only to refer "to issues of jurisdiction and state organisation" but to the "performative constitution of a "we" through collective action and the constitution of a space for a reconciliatory politics in which the appearance of this "we" is an ever-present possibility." 35 The process of political reconciliation, 36 for Schaap, is future- 32 Derrida, "Force of Law", p. 270. 33 Derrida, "Force and Signification", p. 11, my emphasis. There is something of the general strike, and thus of the revolutionary situation, in every reading that founds something new and that remains 36 Thoughout his essay Schaap relies on a somewhat too tidy distinction between "the certainty of law," associated with the restoration of a "universal moral community" on the one hand, and "the risk of politics," associated with the contingency of a future political community on the other hand (see especially the introductory and concluding paragraphs, p. 9 and p. 29). 37 Africa will never return to that abyss and indeed is a better place for all.
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In fact, in many accounts of the building and of daily life at Constitutional Hill, 43 the creation of the artworks and museum spaces, the foundation of the Constitution, and the founding of a polis, are all understood to happen in the same gesture and in the same space. "Like the Constitution,"
writes Albie Sachs, Constitutional Court judge, the Court belongs to and serves the whole nation. We want the eyes, hands and hearts of all our artists famous and unknown, to be involved.
42 Segal (ed.), Number Four, p. 84. 43 The name of the precinct was cause for debate. Albie Sachs: "I proposed that the whole area be called "Freedom Hill" and that it be dedicated to freedom. Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson responded with "Constitution Hill." I was a little dubious; I thought that was giving a kind of a legal slant to the place. But I"m very pleased that he made that suggestion." Segal, Number Four, p. 74. This anecdote perhaps adds point to Andrew Schaap"s argument: "law frustrates political reconciliation by representing community as the given end of politics rather than a contingent historical possibility that conditions the possibility of politics in the present. The tendency of a legal constitution to undercut the ethical constitution of a "we" in this way was demonstrated, for instance, in the constitutional politics of South Africa." Schaap, "The Time of Reconciliation and the Space of Politics", p. 26.
We do not want to acquire loose art and place it in the building but rather ensure that the art is integrated into the very fabric of the building. We want this to be a national project. We want to include people who don"t even know they are artists. We want people who do beautiful doors, crafts and mosaics. 44 In ways that remind me of Paul Celan"s reflections on poetry and of It is with these ideas in mind that I read Derrida"s "Force and Signification" -an essay which offers a sustained critique of structuralist literary discourse. force, a structuralist reading is conducted in purely spatial terms, running the risk of overlooking a history, more difficult to conceive: the history of the meaning of the work itself, of its operation. This history of the meaning of the work is not only its past, the eve or the sleep in which it precedes itself in an author"s intentions, but is also the impossibility of its ever being present, of its ever being summarized by some absolute simultaneity or instantaneousness.
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Force is associated with notions of creation, constitution -which applies both to the founding/preserving violence of the law and to the force of signification in an artwork. It is in very similar terms that Derrida speaks about "the history of the meaning of the work" (in the passage just cited) and the history of the law. Here is a passage from "Force of Law" -to read alongside the passage from "Force and Signification." The moment of founding a law, as we have seen, is an instance of "nonlaw" -but, Derrida continues, it is also the whole history of law. This moment always takes place and never takes place in a presence. It is the moment in which the foundation of law remains suspended in the void or over the abyss, suspended by a pure performative act that would not have to answer to or before anyone. The supposed subject of this pure performative would no longer be before the law [devant la loi], or rather he would be before a law still undetermined … a law still ahead.
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The most striking example of this "history of law" -which will also have become the "history of the meaning" of one of Boshoff"s artworks -is the statement Nelson Mandela delivered from the dock at the Rivonia Trial in
1964
. 61 Mandela voiced a powerful political protest; it was an instance of operating beyond the limit of apartheid law, but in ways that would nevertheless redirect the lines of judgement and defence, and reconfigure
Mandela"s responsive range. He was not making a statement to the judge in his official capacity, and he was not simply speaking in an apartheid court.
Mandela"s was an ethical appeal for justice, addressed to the conscience of his fellow human beings. "By representing myself," says Mandela in his autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom, "I would use my trial as a showcase for the ANC"s moral opposition to racism. I would not attempt to defend myself so much as put the state itself on trial." 62 Of course, in the court of apartheid law, Mandela had no illusions -that he would be pronounced guilty was a
given, but already, at the initial hearings of the trial in 1962, he insisted: "I have no doubt that posterity will pronounce that I was innocent and that the criminals that should have been brought before this court are the members of the government." 63 The effect of Mandela"s speeches during the Rivonia Trial was this: his words crossed law"s line and inaugurated his addressees beyond apartheid"s field of affect. "Right from the start," says Mandela, "we had made it clear that we intended to use the trial not as a test of the law, but as a platform for our beliefs." 64 Further, Mandela tells us, "We had agreed not to plead in the traditional manner, but to use the moment to show our disdain for the proceedings." 65 Mandela"s decision to make a statement from the dock, instead of giving testimony and going through cross-examination, was taken explicitly so that he would "open the defence with a statement of our politics and ideals," even in the knowledge that what he said in the statement wouldn"t carry "the same legal weight as ordinary testimony." 66 Mandela"s speeches had the extraordinary power, let us say force, to recalibrate the socio-political -and ultimately, the legal -setting in which those words would be heard.
Retrospectively, his statement from the dock would be regarded as an originary moment in the founding of South Africa"s democracy.
One excerpt from Mandela"s statement has been cited in several different contexts:
I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die. 
